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The voluminous study of Russian political thought recently published by Gary Hamburg 
covers a vast chronology from the 16th to the early 19th centuries. Hamburg, who cur-
rently holds the position of Otho M. Behr Professor of the History of Ideas at Clare-
mont McKenna College in the USA, is well known among students of political ideas, 
for he published Boris Chicherin & Early Russian Liberalism in 1992 and edited the 
large collective volume A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930: Faith, Reason and 
the Defense of Human Dignity in 2010. The book under review apparently marks the 
expansion of Hamburg’s research interests into an earlier period of Russian history, 
while the title, which repeats the words “faith” and “reason,” indicates the continuity of 
the research program (as Hamburg says, he plans to take the same theme forward with a 
new volume entitled Russia’s Road toward Emancipation: Politics, Faith and Community, 
* This paper was prepared with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic 
Research, project No. 16-31-00007.
Konstantin D. Bugrov
Institute of History and Archaeology 
of the Ural Branch 









Slověne    2017 №2
The Twisted Paths of Faith and Reason: 
Recent Problems in the Study of Russian Enlightenment
1801–1861). As Hamburg admits in the opening chapter, he started to write the book in 
2010; the result, published six years later, was awarded the Marc Raeff  Prize for the best 
book in Eighteenth-Century Russian Studies in 2016.
Hamburg—who begins the text by stating that the major inspirations for his study 
were the works of Vladimir Valdenberg, Quentin Skinner and Andrzej Walicki—builds 
his analysis around the concepts of faith, reason, and Enlightenment. By faith, he 
means “allegiance to Orthodox Christianity and engaging in Orthodoxy’s prescribed 
faith rituals,” emphasizing that Eastern Christianity was more of a “living religion” than 
one of dogmatic debate. Hamburg also introduces two conceptions of Enlightenment 
that co-existed in Russia: “One conception was based squarely on the Orthodox idea 
of spiritual illumination; the other stemmed from attempts to defi ne enlightenment as 
ra tio na lity” (p. 22). As the latter conception provoked questions about whether it is 
pos sib le for reason to exist outside the Orthodox Church, tensions between these two 
grew. From here, the importance of the concept of “secularism” in Hamburg’s theo re-
ti cal model is clear. Since Hamburg follows Charles Taylor’s understanding of secular 
society as a society where religion is privatized by the individual and is merely one “hu-
man possibility among many,” the second concept of Enlightenment in his work ap pears 
to be Enlightenment as a vehicle of secularization. The author summarizes his re search 
goal with the following question: “Did Orthodox Christian notions of faith, po li tics, 
and reason evolve slowly into Enlightenment conceptions of ethics, the just so ciety, and 
ra tionality?” (p. 26)
The work is organized chronologically; it is a set of essays focused on the most 
prominent thinkers of diff erent periods in Russian history. The fi rst part is named 
“Wisdom and Wickedness, 1500–1689.” Hamburg starts with the Sermon on Law and 
Grace, The Tale of Bygone Years and Agapetos before shifting his focus to diff erent in tel-
lec tual phenomena of the 16th century: Iosif Volotskii, the Domostroi, Ivan Peresvetov, 
Feo dosii Kosoi, Metropolitan Filipp (Kolychev), and the polemics of Ivan IV and Andrei 
Kurb skii. The 17th century is represented not only by Grigorii Kotoshikhin, Simeon Po-
lots kii, and the Old Believers, but also by “Stepan Razin’s utopia.”
Yet the bulk of his work is dedicated to 18th-century Russia. The second part, 
“Ways of Virtue (1689‒1762),” deals with the Petrine age, Feofan (Prokopovich), Ivan 
Pososhkov, the crisis of 1730, Dmitrii Golitsyn (who is described as a “virtue philo-
sopher”), Vasilii Tatishchev, and Mikhail Lomonosov. Here, Hamburg states that
each of these thinkers regarded himself primarily as a Christian patriot devoted to 
the advancement of Russian interests through learning, rather than as a cosmopolitan 
devoted to the advancement of modern civilization through the disinterested practice 
of science.
Insisting that Russian political thought adhered to the religious concept of Enlighten-
ment rather than replacing it with secular values, Hamburg emphasizes:
It is important to reject the notion that Peter’s reforms succeeded in secularizing Russia, 
and the related notion that Feofan “secularized Russian thought.” That binary is too 
simple. In the Petrine era, the tensions between Church and state were not resolved by 
legislative acts, but were thoroughly internalized in the psyches of the country’s most 
prominent, eloquent, and farseeing clergymen (p. 263).
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The lengthy third part, entitled “Straining toward Light, 1762–1801,” presents an ana-
ly sis of a dozen leading Russian authors: Catherine II, Metropolitan Arsenii (Ma tse-
evich), Metropolitan Platon (Levshin), Nikita Panin, Denis Fonvizin, Gavriil Derzha-
vin, Ivan Tretʹiakov, Semen Desnitskii, Nikolai Novikov, Aleksandr Radishchev, Mikhail 
Shcherbatov and, fi nally, Nikolai Karamzin. Hamburg’s conclusion is the following:
Russian thinking about politics through the end of the eighteenth century was a branch 
of applied Christian ethics or was heavily infl uenced by Christian ethics. It is therefore 
a basic error to interpret Russian political thinking before the nineteenth century as an 
exclusively secular pursuit (p. 30).
In each chapter, Hamburg proceeds with a methodical analysis of the works of each 
par ticular author. The problem, which is particularly important for a Russian reader, is 
that Hamburg includes long biographical discussions in his essays about the diff erent 
authors, alongside abridged retellings of their writings. Imagine a study of Hobbes’ po-
li ti cal ideas that always starts from a description of his biography! Of course, this pro b lem 
is typical for most works on Russian political thought published in English, and for a 
clear reason: it is obvious that Tatishchev is far less familiar to the English reader than 
Hobbes. But at times it makes the narration rather monotonous, in contrast with the 
author’s otherwise lively manner.
There are some small inconsistencies in the text. For example, Hamburg says that 
Feofan “cited Grotius’s book The Law of Peace and War” (p. 249). However, Grotius’ 
treatise is typically translated into English as On the Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis). Hamburg says that Feofan was most probably familiar with Hobbes; however, 
most recent studies do not verify this. While discussing Shcherbatov’s relations with 
Catherine II, Hamburg observes that Shcherbatov “hoped for her ‘august approval’ of 
his History, and signed the foreword ‘Your lowliest slave [vsenizhaishii rab], Prince Mi-
khai lo Shcherbatov’” (p. 625). But the phrase was at that time an offi  cial appeal to the 
em press, so Shcherbatov was just following etiquette, without any specifi c purpose of 
hu mi lia ting himself.1 In discussing Russian writers’ adherence to the Orthodox Church, 
Ham burg notes that “Kheraskov, in spite of his adherence to Deism and mystical Free-
ma sonry, did not campaign against the Orthodox Church, against ‘religious fanaticism,’ 
or against the autocracy”; while this is true in the fi rst and third cases, Kheraskov did 
attack religious fanaticism harshly in his political novel Numa Pompilius, or the Flouri-
shing Rome (1768).
Undoubtedly, Hamburg draws several interesting conclusions, and his study pro-
vides some important insights. The very emphasis on the religious patterns of Russian 
political thought is of great value. Hamburg’s characterizations of some historical fi  gu res 
are insightful and deep on many occasions. The book, which covers a great chro no logical 
span, off ers a systematic view of the history of early modern Russian political thought.
However, there are three major problems which stalk Hamburg’s work throughout. 
First, Hamburg relies on only a limited number of Russian authors. For instance, he ig-
no res such productive thinkers as Vasilii Trediakovskii, Friedrich Strube de Piermont, 
1 Hamburg makes the same mistake when noting: “About Anna’s humble subjects, 
Feofan spoke honestly at last. He described them as ‘we, your slaves’” (p. 262). And 
again, when speaking of Desnitskii, who “did not hesitate to use Muscovite language in 
describing his own status as a ‘servant’ or ‘slave’ of the crown” (p. 561).
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and Vladimir Zolotnitskii, the author of Russia’s fi rst systematic treatise on natural law. 
The reason seems to be obvious: these authors were marginal in the historiographical 
tradition of the mid-20th century. Ivan Tretʹiakov and Semen Desnitskii, secondary 
authors of the Catherinian age, were of great importance for Soviet historians since 
they presented a progressive Smithian political economy; therefore, their works were 
re pub lished and read again and again. In contrast, the theory of natural law was of 
less in terest to Marxists, and therefore Zolotnitskii or Strube were not republished or 
stu died. Another example is the number of religious writers and preachers, such as 
Si mon (Todorskii), Silvestr (Kuliabka), Amvrosii (Iushkevich), Gavriil (Popov), and 
Iri nei (Klementievskii), to name but a few, who produced lots of “political theology” 
through out the 18th century (the same opinion is expressed by Gary Marker, who wrote 
a generally favorable review for The Russian Review [M 2017]). These authors, 
who knew several languages (including Latin and Greek), were sensible to Western in-
fl uen ces [K 2015]. 
Taking this into account, it is rather surprising that the book starts with a reference 
to Quentin Skinner’s methods as a source of inspiration. The book reproduces the very 
position Skinner was so critical of—namely, the reduction of the history of political 
thought to a textbook with a focus on a handful of “doctrines” [S 2002: 59].
Second, Hamburg’s analysis rests on the contradistinction of Muscovite tradition 
and Western infl uence. Both are understood as monolithic intellectual structures. This 
explanatory model is dangerous, for it tempts the researcher to substitute mere clas si fi -
cation in binary terms fortextual analysis. It is no surprise that Hamburg at times starts 
to speak in a disturbingly pejorative way: of the members of the Legislative Commission, 
he says, “Desnitskii’s learned references to Roman law, his oblique criticism of autocracy 
and of serfdom, his talk about commercial republics, his comments on Smith’s The 
Theo ry of Moral Sentiments, must have sounded like the twittering of birds” (p. 556). 
The existence of Russian tradition turns out to be a consequence of Russia’s despotic 
po litical system: “The tragedy was that, even under Catherine’s relatively benign rule, 
Rus sia did not entirely escape the sixteenth-century pattern of burying its intellectual 
rich ness under a superfi cial conformity” (p. 676). And since Russia’s historical tradition 
is by essence religious and despotic, European innovations could appear only in confl ict 
with that tradition. It’s a zero-sum game!
Such an understanding of Westernization may have led to curious methodological 
as sumptions. For instance, when Hamburg speaks of the crisis of 1730, he uses the con-
tra distinction of Western Enlightenment and Russian tradition in a manner reminiscent 
of Georgii Storm’s Hidden Radishchev, a Soviet classic on the use of Aesopian language:
In the conditions of the absolutist state in which he lived, Golitsyn had to hide his 
knowledge from other members of the elite, to dissimulate his disagreements over the 
direction of his country, to pretend that he was a loyal subject of a crown he could not 
completely respect. When he fi nally spoke to the Supreme Privy Council in 1730, he 
did so forcefully, but without laying out the full justifi cation for his program, and even 
without spelling out the entire program at one sitting of the council. He then let others 
formulate the basic components of a plan he had long contemplated, thus making them 
jointly responsible for its composition (p. 301).
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In other words, it is not necessary to study whether Golitsyn actually had a plan, since 
the researcher can always reconstruct it by simply referring to an explanatory model 
based on the opposition between Enlightenment and tradition. And if Golitsyn’s actions 
were supposedly directed against tradition, then—by the logic of a zero-sum game—
these actions inevitably had to be inspired by Enlightenment principles, even though 
Golitsyn avoided “spelling out the entire program.” These assumptions, which are scat-
tered ac ross the book, are all derived from the same model of interpretation, regardless 
of whe ther Hamburg is calling Semen Desnitskii’s Senate design “a broadly representative 
le gis la ture” or insisting that Nikita Panin championed religious toleration. 
It is probable that the opposition of secularism to religion worked fi ne at the be-
ginning of the 20th century. Nowadays, however, it can hardly serve as a reliable method 
of study. Turning away from the Skinnerian study of vocabularies and manners of 
speech to embrace the history of monolithic doctrines undermines the validity of one of 
Ham burg’s most important and valuable ideas, namely, the emphasis on the importance 
of the concept of virtue in Russian political culture. Since the binary explanatory system 
re quires him to classify each intellectual phenomenon as either Western or traditional, 
Ham burg considers virtue to be solely in the domain of traditional, moralistic, and 
religious culture. The very concepts remain unproblematic: summarizing the de ve lop-
ment of Russian political thought by the end of the 17th century, Hamburg notes:
The Muscovite legacy ultimately inheres in the complexity of Orthodox thinking 
about politics: from the simple assumption that good Christians must pursue virtue 
and attempt to build just societies, there followed profound disagreements over how 
to do so (p. 217).
In other words, Hamburg sees the whole discourse on virtues as something simple, while 
in fact there was no single concept of virtue in 18th-century Russia (and, probably, even 
before the 18th century). Perhaps an analysis of church sermons and ethical manuals 
might add something to this fi eld, as well as an inquiry into 18th-century legislation 
re garding the nobility’s privileges (based on a specifi c concept of noble virtue). Un-
for tunately, the black-and-white explanatory model and narrow scope of historical 
sources prevents Hamburg’s study from examining the conceptual diff erences among 
the defi nitions of virtue in 18th-century Russian public thought.
At times, this explanatory model makes the analysis rather imprecise. Let’s take, 
for example, the chapter on Shcherbatov’s understanding of virtue in the Journey to the 
Land of Ophir:
The Ophirians had slowly realized that, in olden times, they had fl attered their leaders, 
had pretended that their leaders’ paper plans for model cities were feasible, and had 
succumbed to a general corruption of morals. The Ophirians now recognized that 
their leaders should be respected rather than fl attered, and that there is no point in 
pretending that paper plans are necessarily feasible. They had become realists with 
respect to city planning and all other governmental projects. The Ophirians had also 
recovered their moral sense [. . .]. They now found disorderly lives shameful, and they 
claimed to pursue virtue in all things (p. 635).
This lengthy quotation shows the negative eff ects of treating virtue as a simple, un-
ivocal moralist formula: Hamburg fails to grasp the social mechanics of virtue that 
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Shcherbatov was describing in detail in his utopia. The notion of “paper cities” was used 
by Shcherbatov as a detail to demonstrate his criticism of Catherine’s urban policies 
(the reconstruction of Tver, to be exact): by no means can it be read as his explanation 
for the emergence of virtue. Hamburg omits Shcherbatov’s idea of restricting luxury 
and commerce to create a social environment suitable for moral revival. In Hamburg’s 
analysis, the virtue of the Ophirians looks like a simple refusal to fl atter monarchs and 
to live shamefully; but, in fact, Shcherbatov saw quite clearly that virtue is grounded 
not only in the personal choice of whether to live shamefully or not, but also in social 
conditions, thus echoing the European tradition from Machiavelli to Montesquieu.
Shcherbatov, according to Hamburg, wanted to construct a “crazy hybrid” of the 
“best features of Muscovy” and the “best elements of European modernity”; how ever, 
“few Russians shared his appreciation for Muscovy, and fewer still his austere com-
mit ment to the virtuous life.” This contradicts Hamburg’s own idea that virtue was the 
key element in the understanding of politics in Russia. Moreover, Shcherbatov’s views 
were rather common in 18th-century Russia, and the features which he attributed to 
ima ginary Ophir and historical Muscovy were partially drawn from Western political, 
ethi cal, and historical literature, usually following the pattern of Ancient Rome. Yet 
Ham burg says nothing of these Roman patterns, instead explaining Shcherbatov’s ideas 
through his biography:
He was a legatee of Muscovite family values caught in the dynamic but corrupt world of 
Catherine II, a Russian traditionalist and yet simultaneously a European cosmopolitan 
[. . .] In the future, Catherine made use of Shcherbatov’s talents as historian, but she 
never trusted him with the high offi  ce that might otherwise have been proff ered to a 
person of his background and attainments.
But Shcherbatov was born in 1733, a long time after the Petrine reforms had been 
launched; what specifi c kind of “Muscovite legacy” was he supposed to have received? 
Equal ly, Shcherbatov’s career was far from unsuccessful: he was the head of the Col-
legium for State Income from 1778 to 1784, and—during his time in the offi  ce—par ti-
ci pated actively in the discussion about laws on luxury, along with the most powerful 
offi   cials of his time, General Procurator Aleksandr Viazemskii and the head of the Col-
le gium for Commerce, Ernst Munnich; Shcherbatov’s ideas on luxury here were similar 
to the views he put on paper in his unpublished works.
Yet another example of the defi ciency of the binary explanatory model is the chap-
ter on the Old Believers. Hamburg investigates whether Avvakum legitimized ac tive 
re sistance (“armed rebellion”) to the crown, concluding that Avvakum’s ideas on re sis-
tance were rather “murky” (p. 180). But Hamburg says nothing about the Old Be lie vers’ 
readi ness to resist by killing themselves; apparently, such a concept does not fi t the 
book’s explanatory model.
Also, speaking of Western infl uence on Russia, which “should not be under esti-
ma ted,” Hamburg shapes this infl uence to conform with the explanatory model. The 
Wes tern contribution he talks about includes Montesquieu, Rousseau, Beccaria and the 
German cameralists, Smith, and so on. He fails to recognize, though, that Roberto Bel-
lar mine, the Spanish anti-Machiavellists, and St. Augustine were also Western authors, 
and that in the world of printed texts and manuscript translations, they were much more 
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popular than, say, Smith. In other words, the realm of ethics in Westernized Russia 
was also dominated by European authors; but to recognize this would at the same time 
disrupt an explanatory model based on the clear opposition between Russia and the 
West, ethics and politics. And Hamburg is aware of this; for instance, he productively 
discusses the infl uence of Justus Lipsius on Artemii Volynskii and Vasilii Tatishchev, 
but assigns Lipsius two roles: in one case, Lipsius appears as a source of inspiration for 
circumscribing royal power with the expertise of wise advisors (thus being a mani festa-
tion of European Enlightenment replacing Russia’s essential culture of obedience and 
auto cracy), while in the other case, Lipsius is characterized merely as an “ardent Ca tho-
lic” whose infl uence was dissolved within Russia’s own religious tradition. As a result, 
Ham burg remains silent about Lipsius when discussing European infl uence in general; 
an “ardent Catholic” is not the kind of European Enlightenment thinker about whom 
the binary explanation speaks.
In addition, the use of “Western Enlightenment” and “Russian tradition” as labels 
always leads to the risk of confusion. Thus, Hamburg marks Catherine’s ideas on liberty, 
formulated in her Instruction, as controversial: he considers the arguments of point 38 
to be part of a “positive liberty” tradition, and the concepts from points 41 and 42 to be 
a borrowing from Montesquieu as a “rudimentary sketch” of “negative liberty.” But, in 
fact, Catherine was following Montesquieu in defi ning liberty in both cases, and so her 
defi nition of liberty was generally leaning toward “negative liberty,” provoking angry 
comments from Aleksandr Sumarokov. Sumarokov noted that honest persons knew 
the truth in their hearts and therefore “laws are prescribed for those who fi ght the truth 
[boriushchim istinu]” [S 2006: 135], while Catherine and Montesquieu insisted 
that liberty is “the right to do whatever the laws do not prohibit.”
These confusions might have been avoided had Hamburg relied more on the 
existing body of historical studies. But Hamburg’s book almost totally omits the recent 
historiography, which is the third and probably most serious problem of this volume. 
The most recent work on Shcherbatov’s thought which Hamburg mentions is Ivan Fe-
do sov’s book [F 1967]. The most recent work on Panin’s political ideas is David 
Ran sel’s solid work [R 1975], though Hamburg also quotes Oleg Omelchenko’s 
mar velous study of 2001 on the Commission of the Noble Liberty; yet he remains silent 
with respect to recent works on Panin [P 2000; P 2010]. Speaking of 
to leration and faith in 18th-century Russia, Hamburg never quotes any book on to-
leration issues, even the fundamental work by A R [2006]; it seems like 
Ham burg’s equation of pre-modern society with the realm of fanatical adherence to the 
Church prevents him from analyzing the complexity of the toleration policies developed 
in Catherinian Russia. The same could be said in relation to the earlier periods studied 
by Hamburg. These examples could be multiplied. This historiographical isolation 
at times really surprises the reader: investigating whether Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii was 
really proposing a “Bill of Rights” to his subjects, Hamburg polemicizes with. . . Sergei 
Solovʹev. In a rather loose outline of Avvakum’s political ideas, he argues with Sergei 
Ber diaev and Konstantin Leontʹev.
There is also one omission that we would like to stress specifi cally. Hamburg refers 
to Boris Uspenskĳ ’s Tsar and Patriarch [Uo  1998] twice in the opening chapters 
when talking of medieval political thought, but he never refers to Boris Uspenskĳ ’s 
and Viktor Zhivov’s fundamental study of early modern Russian political culture, “Tsar 
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and God” [Z, Uo  1994]. Here Uspenskĳ  and Zhivov posed the crux of 
the matter with poignancy: the rhetorical strategies of the sacralization of the monarch 
in 18th-century Russia were not part of tradition, but rather a Western innovation in-
t ro duced in the late 17th century. Is it possible to seriously discuss the problem of the 
se cu larization of 18th-century Russian political culture without referring to this im por-
tant thesis?
There are some major omissions in the English-speaking historiography too, the 
most notable of which is that Max Okenfuss’ controversial study of Latin humanism in 
ear ly modern Russia [O 1995], which provides conclusions that correspond 
with Hamburg’s own ideas, is not mentioned at all. The splendid study by E W-
 [2003] is totally omitted, even though Wirtschafter’s work contains some 
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